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The REWSON project (PME-107) of the Naval Electronics
Systems Command is concerned with obtaining maintenance in-
formation for its equipment in a timely and accurate manner.
They want to identify and correct problem.s as they are
developing rather than waiting until they become critical.
This study reviews the available alternatives for obtaining
maintenance information. It discusses the advantages and
disadvantages of each and provides a recommended course of
action. The recommendations suggest that expanded use of the
Fleet Reliability Assessment Program (FRAP) is the best alter-
native for analyzing an identified problem equipment, while
the actual identification of problem equipment is best done
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" The 5M system does not provide the information that we
need accurately or in a timely manner to adequately support
our equipment. Do we need our own maintenance reporting system
or is there one available to do the job without reinventing
the wheel? "
The above statements are paraphrases o£ Captain H. M.
Leavitt, Jr., of the REWSON Project (PME-107-1) of the Naval
Electronics Systems Command (NAVELEX) , Washington, D. C.
This project procures and supports highly sophisticated equip-
ment from cradle to grave; i.e., from design to procurement
to fleet operation to withdrawl from service. This is unlike
most electronic equipment program managers whose mission is
usually completed subsequent to fleet introduction of the
last equipment on a procurement contract. Normally then the
item is managed by NAVELEX for the remainder of its life cycle.
The primary reason for the difference between REWSON and
other projects is that the life cycle of REWSON equipments
is much shorter than most of the usual equipment managed by
NAVELEX.
PME-107's concern for equipment it develops usually in-
volves quickly correcting a situation which is adversely
affecting the equipment's performance. The problem may be in
engineering design, maintainability, or system supply support.
The principal sources of information about such problems are
the Maintenance Material Management (3M) central data bank,

Casualty Reports (CASREPTS) , and direct fleet input.
The intent of the 3M system as originally designed was
to provide equipment managers with maintenance information
which would give early indications of developing problems.
These would be expected long before CASREPTS or direct fleet
complaints. However, as will be detailed later, experience
with the 3M system has been unrewarding. Inaccurate and in-
complete information, a long processing pipeline (as much as
12 to 18 months) and other factors make the data almost use-
less .
Once the problem is identified, it is necessary to per-
form an engineering analysis, decide on what corrective action
is necessary, develop a plan of action and milestones and
implement the action. If additional funds or equipment pro-
curements are necessary, then there is the potential delay
of the entire budget cycle and procurement leadtime before
the fleet sees any action. This process could take as much
as three or more years.
The entire elapsed time from the actual event to ulti-
mate solution may take as much as five years! By this time
the existing system may be obsolete! One way of reducing this
time is to reduce the time now taken to notify PME-107 about
equipment problems. That is what Captain Leavitt was alluding
to in the first paragraph.
B
. Another Dimension
While researching the various aspects of this problem,
the author also explored what impact the rapidly changing

world of electronics has upon this problem.
The era of microminiaturization is upon us and moving at
an incredible rate. " A 'generation' in the field of digital
hardware is only about 15 months, bringing about significant
changes in capability and cost." (5:58) It is anticipated
that by 1980 an entire computer system will be on a single
silicon chip, having thousands of words of core storage.
Yet, the costs will be down to hundreds rather than the thou-
sands of dollars of today. Even now, " at acceptable cost,
we can build into an expendable missile more information pro-
cessing capability than could be accommodated in a cruiser in
World War II ." (6:117)
Additionally, this new technology has led to built-in
test capabilities in many electronics systems. This capabil-
ity permits " rapid fault isolation in place and offers the
potential for significant reductions in the time needed to
restore these systems to service." (3:356)
Although these built-in test equipment are in fact micro
processors, they are not presently used to provide even basic
maintenance reporting data. Reporting of mainentance actions
is still being accomplished totally by maintenance personnel.
As will be suggested later, the data preparation could be
automated and accuracy and completeness of the data could
be improved by using these processors.

1 1 . Ob j ective
The objective of this study is to determine the best
possible method for PME-107 to receive maintenance data which
will permit timely analysis of declining equipment performance
as it is developing. PME-107 desires rapid visualization of
problems before they become critical.
This study will be limited to shipboard electronic
equipment only (aviation equipment is therefore excluded)
since this study was prepared for PME-107 of the Naval Elec-
tronics Systems Command. However, there is no implication
intended that the recommendations from this study could not
be applied to other systems.
To reach this objective, the study will explore the fol-
lowing alternatives and determine the pros and cons of each.
1. Establish a specialized reporting system similiar to
that used to study the AN/BRD-7 system by PME-107.
2. Rely on the 3M system.
3. Utilize Project Intercept.
4. Utilize the Fleet Reliability Assessment Program or
similiar procedures.
5. Utilize the DART and/or the CASREPT programs.
6. Utilize supply demand data in lieu of maintenance
reporting
.
The study will then conclude with a comparison of the
alternatives and will recommend a plan of action.

III. The PME-107 Study
The AN/BRD-7 is an electronic countermeasures and
direction finding receiver used aboard fleet submarines and
is managed by PME-107. Several years ago significant concern
was raised that this equipment was not meeting the minim.um
specification of 500 hours mean time between failures (MTBF)
.
Therefore, PME-107 established a program to collect main-
tenance data which could be used to determine the actual re-
liability and maintainability of this equipment. This data
was to then be compared to equipment specifications and con-
tractor data and corrective action was to be taken as neces-
sary.
The program was designed to collect data for a six-month
period and/or at least one deployment.
The objectives of this effort were:
(a) Determine AN/BRD-7 reliability in the fleet
environment
.
(b) Identify those areas where reliability problems
were detected and those areas where potential
reliability problems exist.
(c) Determine AN/BRD-7 maintainability character-
istics in the fleet environment.
(d) Identify those areas which affect system main-
tainability .
(e) Report and record those characteristics which
affect its overall effectiveness in such areas
as human factors, technical manuals and logis-
tic support . (9:2)
In addition, special reports were to be prepared for all
corrective maintenance actions necessitated by "unsatisfactory
system performance", including only "those failures discovered:
(1) by maintenance personnel during a system check;
(2) by maintenance personnel during a routine or pre-
ventive maintenance action; or

(3) by operating personnel during normal system opera-
tion. (9:3)
Utilizing a specially designed form, the associated correc-
tive maintenance actions v/ere recorded by shipboard personnel
and forwarded to PME-107's agent for analysis. Additionally,
all throwaway parts were also forwarded for subsequent ana-
lysis .
After obtaining the concurrence and authorization of the
Commander, Submarine Force, Atlantic Fleet (COMSUBLANT) in
January, 1975, personnel representing PME-107 installed the
data collection program on six designated platforms.
As a consequence of this effort and the corrective ac-
tions of the contractor, Sanders Associates, the MTBF was im-
proved from below the equipment specification of 43*^ con-
fidence up to a 11% confidence that the MTBF is not less than
500 hours as of September, 1977. (8:3)
This special reporting system did in fact achieve the
desired results, but with some disadvantages:
1. PME-107 had to design its own forms.
2. PME-107 had to establish a reporting network.
3. PME-107 had to administer the program itself.
4. PME-107 had to analyze each report for relevance.




1. The program highlighted problems which could be
analyzed and corrected expeditiously.
2. The program featured face-to-face liaison with fleet
11

personnel. The fleet actually saw the results of
their efforts bear fruit.
3. The program reduced the information pipeline time
1 7

IV. The 5M System
A. Background
The modern Navy is a far cry from the day of the sail.
Advances in technology have created today's modern warships
with very sophisticated and complex v/eapons systems. As
these systems developed, a need also was developed for a
standard and simple means of maintaining and supporting
these systems. As a result, in January, 1963, George
Washington University was assigned the problem by the Office
of Naval Research. The result of their research was the Navy's
Maintenance, Material Management (3M) system concept.
The emphasis of the 5M system is to:
• Standardize ships and aviation maintenance
procedures
.
• Collect maintenance data at its source once and
only once.
• Collect data in a manner facilitating ABP (Auto-
matic Data Processing)
• Make the Maximum Use of ADP Process in Analyzing
Maintenance Data" (16:1-3)
Figure 1 presents the basic 3M program organization
responsible for operation of the maintenance reporting system.
The activities which support the organization shown at the
bottom are basically the data interface between the fleet and
the central data bank. The actual data flow will be described
later
.
Figure 2 shows the basic shipboard 3M organization.
B . Program Description
The 3M system is divided into two subsystems. One is
the Preventive Maintenance System (PMS) and the other is the
Maintenance Data Subsystem (MDS)
.
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The PMS portion does not require system reporting. The
only requirement is that the preventive maintenance actions
be scheduled, completed, and recorded locally. However, a
planned maintenance sub-system feedback report (OPNAV form
4790/7B) should be submitted by the local command to recom-
mend improvements, recommend safety precautions, report errors,
replace materials, and request that some action or equipment
be included in the PMS. These reports are submitted to the
type commander or Navy Maintenance Management Field Office.
Type commanders are responsible for performing inspections
of local records to ensure PMS actions are being performed.
(16:1.17-1.18)
The Maintenance Data System is the sub-system which
reports corrective maintenance actions. It is through this
sub-system that manhour, maintenance performed/required, and
parts usage data are collected. (16:1.24) Two of these,
labor and narrative data, are reported on a Ship's Maintenance
Action Form (2-KILO) Parts data is recorded on a consump-
tion management document (NAVSUP form 1250) or a requisition
document (DD form 1348).
The 2-KILO forms are forwarded to the supporting ADP
facility as designated under the Intermediate Maintenance
Activity Management System (IMMS), usually a tender. Here
the manual maintenance action forms are processed and output
on magnetic tape. These tapes are then forwarded to the
appropriate Data Processing Service Center (DPSC) , either
Atlantic (LANT) or Pacific (PAC) . The tapes are forwarded to

the Maintenance Support Office Department (MSOD) of the Navy
Fleet Material Support Office (FMSO) . Finally, they are in-
put to the central data file stored on the Ship's Parts Con-
trol Center's (SPCC) computer. There are, as usual, excep-
tions to the above procedure. All aircraft carriers and
selected shore activities submit their maintenance tapes
directly to MSOD.
The repair parts data information is forwarded separate-
ly to MSOD via the DPSC's by all ships.
Unfortunately, maintenance reports are not submitted on
all equipment for every corrective maintenance action. The
determination of whether an action is reported or not is
quite complicated and is based on the type of maintenance
action
.
There are three types of corrective maintenance actions.
First, a non-deferred maintenance action is one which is in-
itiated and completed by the originator (ship's force) with-
out deferring it. This type must be reported by all cruisers
and submarines. Additionally, designated ships must report
this action for those equipment on the Selected Equipment
List, (19:4) The Selected Equipment List encompasses approx-
imately 500-600 of the Navy's 11,000 equipments. (20)
Second, there is the deferred maintenance action. All
ships must report this type of action. A deferred maintenance
action includes all actions which:
-Require some type of assistance from activities
external to the ship.
-Are not expected to be accomplished by ship's
force personnel within 30 days (or other time

frame prescribed by the type commander)
.
-Describes uncorrected deficiencies reported by an
Inspection and Survey Team (INSURV). (19:4)
The third type of action involves the issue of repair
parts in support of maintenance. All ships are required to
report those parts used in support of maintenance regardless
of the type of maintenance action. [19:4)
This abbreviated procedure was the result of Admiral
Zumwalt's efforts to reduce shipboard workload. Prior to his
decision, all maintenance actions, including preventive main-
tenance actions, were reported by all ships.
C . Disadvantages
The 5M system has some serious shortcomings as PME-107
found out when they attempted to correlate their own data with
3M system, reports.
Since the AN/BRD-7 was on the Selected Equipment List,
PME-107 attempted to correlate 160 of their failure reports
with the associated 3M data. The results of the comparison
are presented in Table I. A "relevant failure", as used be-
low, means a failure of the type reported in the PME-107 study
described in Chapter III.
PME-107 Data 5M Data
Operating Hours 88671 N/A
Relevant Failures 160 76
MTBF (in hours) 555 ?
Table I.- PME-107 data versus 5M data
Some of the 5M reported failures were not relevant to
the study ( such as equipment down during ship alteration,

readiness check performed or other such inapplicable informa-
tion) . Additionally, only 38 of the 76 3M relevant failures
correlated with the 160 relevant failures reported to PME-107.
Mean time between failures (MTBF) could not be calculated
from the 3M data, since 3M does not record operating hour
figures
.
Finally, the basic data in the 3M reports had errors.
Incomprehensible manhours expended figures were reported.
For instance, thirty-four antenna failures only showed a
total of three manhours expended to repair. Equipment serial
numbers were inaccurately reported. For instance, serial
number, A3, was reported in fifteen incorrect ways, includ-
ing A- 3, 3A, AN/BRD-7, 1, one, none, and others. Some reports
were ludicrously inapplicable. These included improvements
to crew mess habi tability
,
inadequate spares, and others.
Another problem of the 3M system is its timeliness. As
an example, in June 1977, of the shipboard maintenance actions
received at MSOD, only 18^6 were less than 50 days old. In
comparison
,
during the same month 42''5 of th.e aviation main-
tenance actions received were less than 30 days old. Yet the
number of transactions. for the aviation community was 5 times
greater than the shipboard community. (17)
D . Improvement Efforts
What is being done to relieve some of the problems
highlighted above? The principal coordinated effort is the
Ships' 3M Improvement Program (SMIP) . SHIP is managed by the





(See Figure 1.) This program is a collection
of projects being managed by several of the Naval Material
systems commands, monitored by the policy committee. (14: In-
troduction)
One of the SMIP improvement efforts attempted by the
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) was the Partial Source
Data Automation (PSDA) . The objective of the program was to
simplify shipboard maintenance reporting still further and
yet to improve the accuracy of data provided by the main-
tenance man.
PSDA uses plastic cards simiiliar to oil company credit
cards. These cards include fixed equipment identification
data elements, such as equipment name, allowance parts list
(APL) number, serial number, location, etc. The cards are
used with a mechanical imprinter machine to print card data
on an automated maintenance action form (OPNAV 4790/2Q).
Additionally, the PSDA printer can input several categories
of variable data through the changing of manual levers,
hese categories include "when discovered", "status", "cause",
and others. (16: I. 33-1. 34)
The idea has merit, but MSOD personnel indicated that of
those ships equipped with the cards only sixteen percent of
their maintenance action forms utilize the "automated" equip-
ment. When asked why, they indicated that on most ships the
PSDA cards and imprinter are maintained in a central location.
Thus, when most personnel do the required maintenance, they
prefer to fill out a manual 2-KILO form in their work space
20

and submit that report rather than going to the PSDA equip-
ment.
Unless many nore imprinters are installed, PSDA appears
to have failed to solve the problem that it was developed for.
Other topics currently under study in SMIP include "3M
System Reorganization", "Minimize Planned Maintenance Require-
ments", "PMS Training", and the "Maintenance Data System".
The latter is by far the largest portion of SMIP and PSDA is
actually a part of it. Other components of it are "Depot
Level 3M Procedures", "Improved Management Reports from MSOD"
,
"ADP Support for Organizational Level Ships", and "Project
Intercept". (To be discussed later.) (14:Index)
Even though many areas of 3M are being reviewed and
studied, the ultimate resolution and relief for the fleet is
years away. For instance, the "ADP Support for Organizational
Level Ships" project is considered critically behind schedule
by the 5M policy committee. It involves the development of
a mini-computer for operational fleet units. The software
is currently under development. The first unit will not be
installed until 1979 aboard the FFG-7 class ships. Because
of budgetary requirements and approval requirements of the
Brooke's Congressional committee for all computer procure-
ments, complete fleetwide installations is years away.
E
. Advantages
The 3M has several significant advantages:
1. The 3M data bank is better than nothing! It con-
tains a great deal of valuable data readily available.
91

2. The system is established and understood by the fleet.
There is no new learning curve effect and no adminis-
trative development necessary.
3. Improvements are underway which should have signifi-
cant impact on solving its problems in the long run.
4. The 3M data bank is mechanized and very flexible.
The variations of reports available are almost limit-
less. There are 38 standard reports with many options
for each report. (20) Additionally, special reports
can be developed if feasible. (16:11.8) The system
through these reports performs a "filtering" function
Filtering reduces "unneeded or irrelevant data being
accepted for processing or being output." (3:108)
This reduces the need for the manager to review all




Although a vast amount of data is being input to the 3M
central data bank, there is comparatively minimal use being
made of the information. Only eleven monthly/quarterly re-
curring reports to fifty-six customers are output as ships 3M
information reports. This is approximately twenty percent
of the number of similiar reports output for aviation 5M re-
ports. (17)
Why are the reports not used? With the multitude of
tasks facing the manager aboard ship, he requires reports
that will help him do his job better. In fact, the manager
needs to "be concerned only with deviations outside allowable
control limits." (3:135) This translates into a requirement
for exception reports that highlights his problems.
Ships' 3M information reports, which must be ordered from
the Maintenance Support Office Department (MSOD) , do not pro-
vide such information. These reports are simply consolida-
tions of all data. There is no attempt to highlight excep-
tional data. Thus, the shipboard m.anager, trying to decide
which report to use, does not know which report will in fact
provide him with the most useful information.
With that spirit in mind, a Chief of Naval Material
policy statement in 1973 directed that the 3M system be ex-
tended to actively "push" information to appropriate Naval
Material Command managers when potential problems were indi-
cated. As a result. Project Intercept was established in

1974. (15:5)
B , Program Description
Project Intercept uses the following procedures:
1. Establishes equipment performance standards.
2. Utilizes the Maintenance Data System to measure
equipments' Reliability, Maintainability, and





problem equipments to cognizant action
activities
.
4. Monitors remedial action taken.
5. Feeds back progress to the fleet. (16:IV.4)
The equipment performance standards or indicators are
command specified measures of performance. They include Mean
Time Between Corrective Maintenance Actions, Mean Time to
Repair, Mean Down Time, Availability, and Number of Safety
Maintenance Actions. The specified level for each standard
is compared to the actual fleet average utilizing a signifi-
cant difference test. If the test indicates a difference,
then the equipment is "intercepted" and reported to the cog-
nizant authorities in a Report of Intercepts. (15 : End
.
(1) ,p . 5)
The Report of Intercepts is published twice a year on
50 August and 28 February. (15 : End . (1) ,p . 11)
The followup report to the Report of Intercepts is the
Intercept Monitor Report, This report specifies the action
activity "to investigate, confirm, or dismiss and, if needed
and feasible, take action to resolve the suspected problem."




p . 4) It also includes a status report on action
taken. The Intercept Monitor Report is also published twice
a year on 50 November and 50 May. However, action activities
must report their initial response within sixty days sub-
24






Project Intercept has been plagued with problems. The
problems are concentrated in two areas: (1) Measurement of
equipment performance and (2) System command actions on Poten-
tial Problems Reports (PPR) which are the critical portion
of the Report of Intercepts.
The problems in the measurement of equipment performance
result from inadequate funding and maintenance data system
deficiencies. Inadequate funding from the hardware systems
commands has limited the number of performance indicators
that have been calculated. To date, only about 100 of the
approximately 540 equipments in Project Intercept have per-
formance indicators developed.
One of the principal maintenance data system deficiencies
is that the 3M data base is not complete enough for Inter-
cept's essential computations. For instance, 3M does not re-
cord equipment operating time as was discovered by PME-107.
MSOD must perform a manual effort to analyze the data and to
draw essential data from other sources. This method relies
heavily on estimation techniques which cause a loss of
accuracy and credibility. "This contributes to resistance by
the technical community to use of the data as a valid basis
for measurement of equipment RM§A (Reliability, Maintainabili-
ty, and Availability) and for problem identification. This
underlying attitude about MDS data analysis and use may be
25

at the root of much of the inadequate responses from the
technical community on Intercept PPR's." (15:18-19)
The second problem area deals with system command res-
ponse to PPR's. Much of the work of analyzing the reports
are performed by industrially funded activities. These
activities are not adequately funded for the analysis effort.
Therefore, the analysis is not done or, at the very least, de-
layed. There is no coordination between the hardware commands
and the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) concerning the
same equipment. There have been reports which cited a parts
problem while NAVSUP independently concluded that it was not
a parts problem. Also the Intercept iMonitor Reports have
been superficial and infrequently updated. (15:20-21) Thus,
this potentially valuable program has been floundering in a
sea of funding deficiencies, confusion, incredibility, and
non- support
.
In summary, the advantages of Project Intercept are:
1. Project Intercept provides exception reporting.
It alleviates some of the manager's problems of
data review,
2. Minimal investment is involved, since the syst
is in operation. Only the development of the
indicators requires funds at the beginning.
3. Project Intercept looks at those engineering







1. Project Intercept depends on the 3M system for
its data. Therefore, it has the same disadvan-
tages as the 3H system.
2. Apparently none of PME-107's equipment have
paramenters developed in Intercept.
3. Inadequate funding both for the development of
standards and for subsequent analysis have re-
duced the program's effectiveness.
27

VI . Fleet Reliability Assessment Program (FRAP)
This program is a failure reporting, analysis, and cor-
rective action system for NAVELEX electronics newly intro-
duced to the fleet. (10:1-1) The program uses the existing
3M procedures augmented by special FRAP requirements. The
objective of FRAP is to identify reliability, avail ibility,
and maintainability problems as soon as possible after the
fleet introduction of the equipment. This is done to take
corrective action under contract warranty provisions and/or
before production is complete on the first follow-on equip-
ment .
The program is limited to:
a. no more than 20 equipments at any one time.
b. equipment of systems with critical fleet applications
c. anticipated large populations. (11:1)
The program does not analyze all data from the fleet
population. Instead, FRAP gathers data from a selected
sample utilizing statistical sampling techniques. Once a
platform, ship, has been selected, FR.AP personnel visit the
ship to give shipboard personnel training on hoxyj to fill out
the additional data needed. The program uses the standard
Ships Maintenance Action Form (2-KILO) with additional data
added. The 2-KILO is distributed normally except that one
copy is sent to either the West Coast or East Coast FRAP
data collection activity. Additionally, when possible all
throwaway modules removed and replaced are sent to the data
collection activity for analysis. (2:2-3)
28

After six months or so of data collection, FRAP analyzes
all the fleet and depot level repair data and a final report
is published for distribution to interested activities by
the activity assigned the analysis responsibility. The report
summarizes the situation found and, if appropriate, recommends
corrective action. It should be emphasized that, since the
program is aimed at new deployed equipment and not simply
problem equipment, the report may, in fact, find that the
equipment is operating well and even exceeding specifications.
(5)
Program limitations are due principally to funding
restrictions and available capacity of the managing office
(ELEX 4702) to analyze the data. Currently, competing prior-
ities in NAVELEX have so limited the funds allocated to FRAP
that the present program includes only six equipment's. (5)
In summary, some of the program's benefits are:
1. Identifies problems while the contractor is
still responsible for its performance.
2. Identifies actual operating failure rates which
can then be used to update on-board spare parts
allowances
.
3. Motivates the contractor to perform in-house
failure analysis,
4. Identifies inadequate specifications and testing
requirements
.





1. Limited program due to funding constraints.
2. Presently looks at only newly deployed equipment
3. May only result in confirmation that the equip-
ment is operating satisfactorily.
4. Statistically random error is possible since it
does not look at all data. This could mean that
a problem is identified by FRAP sampling tech-
niques that really is not a problem at all. Al-
though remote, this could result in a misalloca-
tion of valuable resources,




VII. DART and CASREPT Programs
A. Detection, Action, and Response Technique (DART)
The objective of the DART Program is to identify
the fleet's material readiness problems and provide the
management attention, resources, and direction necessary
to correct each problem through achievement of the equip-
ment/system design requirements. (12:1)
Established in October, 1970, to improve fleet support,
the DART program is limited to the "fleet's most serious
material readiness problems." This is to "insure concentra-
tion of management and resources needed for resolution." (12:
2)
The program deals with all phases of the problem area.
It reviews reliability, maintainability, design, usage,
logistics support elements, training, m.anning, and documenta-
tion. It coordinates these diverse areas into unified plan
of action and milestones including funding resources.
It is intended to be a remedial program. It handles
those problems which have already caused significant material
readiness degradation. Therefore, it will not respond to
the problem of PME-107.
B
.
Casualty Reporting System (CASREPT)
The Casualty Reporting System provides a
timely method for reporting equipment failures and the
effect of these failures on the capability of the re-
porting unit to perform its assigned mission(s). (18:v.)
The individual casualty report identifies a problem on
the individual ship. As such, these reports do not provide
the trend information essential to PME-107 analysis. How-
ever, casualty reporting is the quickest source of informa-
tion about a previously unknown problem. CASREPTs are sub-
31

mitted by Naval message to all activities in the ship's
chain of command including the appropriate hardware systems
command. Therefore, all CASREPTs concerning PME-107 equipment
can be a valuable source of information.
Again this system, like DART, deals with equipment which
tends "to reduce the combat readiness of the Navy". (18 :v.)
These are not routine corrective maintenance actions. CAS-
REPTs represent a failure of corrective maintenance actions.
Although the data does not follow all maintenance actions, it
can provide data needed by PME-107 earlier than concurrent 3M
reports on the same equipment.
The Navy Fleet Material Support Office (FMSO)
has been designated as the focal point for the collec-
tion of data from CASREPTs submitted by all afloat units.
The data collected is utilized in the production of
various summary and informational reports.... (18 :v.}
There are 42 different reports with many reports having op-
tional data elements. Recurring reports may be requested via
the chain of command to FMSO. (lS:i-ii)
If an equipment is experiencing increased CASREPT
activity, this system is useful in consolidating that data to
facilitate analysis. This would be especially useful for
depot level repairables. Consolidated CASREPT data could re-
veal a number of problems;
a. A shortage of system spares;
b. A shortage of carcasses to repair;
c. Extended leadtimes to procure spares; or
d. Unexpected increase in demand, because of incorrect
projection of mean time between failures.
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In summary, the advantages of the CASREPT system are:
1. CASREPTs are the most rapid and timely source of in-
formation on previously unknown problems.
2. Reports are available which consolidate CASREPT data
to facilitate analysis.
3. CASREPTs provide information on a number of other
problem areas, such as supply support, personnel,
training, etc.
The disadvantages are:
1. CASREPTs report only critical unresolved failures.
2. CASREPTs can be random with little or no definite
trend.
3. These limitations necessitates further data collec-
tion and analysis to determine sources of the problems.
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VIII. Supply Demand Reporting
Another alternative for gathering information about
PME-107 equipment is to utilize supply demand data from the
iMaster Data File of NAVSUP ' s Uniform Inventory Control Pro-
gram (UICP) to highlight those equipments experiencing in-
creased supply requirements. The NAVSO P-1500 guarantees the
use of these inventory control programs to anyone in the Navy.
In view of the above, there are areas that should be of
interest to PME-107:
1. Demand data- The v/eapon systems file in UICP has a
record of every installed stock-numbered part on each
ship and also contains the interrelationship between
weapons, systems and subsystems all the way down to
the individual parts. Increased demand of parts may
possibly be caused by the increased requirement for
those parts by the equipment. Since increased parts
usage implies increased equipment failures, supply
demand can be used to highlight those problem equip-
ment
2. Depot Level Maintenance Information- Presently, the
3M system does not report depot level maintenance;
expansion to include depot level is part of the Ships'
Maintenance Improvement Program described in Chapter
IV under Improvement efforts for the 3M system. How-
ever, the supply system presently collects data in




a. Carcass return rate
b. Repair survival rate
c. Repair turnaround time
By "carcass return" is meant the return of not- ready- for-
issue (NRFI) equipment, which must be repaired prior to re-
issue. The supply system gathers information on these return
rates to determine if enough carcasses are being returned to
satisfy existing or projected supply demand. If the return
rate is less than 100°o, then the total number of available
spare equipment is diminishing. Knowledge in this area could
highlight a number of problems:
(1) The fleet is ignoring turn-in procedures.
(2) The equipment should not be classified as a turn-in
repairable. The equipment may usually be beyond
economical repair prior to turn-in and actually
irreparable
.
(3] Equipment is being lost in the system by improper
handling, errors in procedure, or incorrect shipping
instructions
.
Repair survival rate is the success rate of the depot in
repairing returned NRFI equipment. A survival rate of 75
percent indicates that 75 out of every 100 returned NRFI
equipment can be repaired. Changes in this rate, especially
a decline, could indicate equipment problems that require en-
gineering analysis.
The repair turnaround time is the time from the begin-
ning of a carcass' repair until it is repaired and returned
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to the supply system in "ready-for- issue (RFI)" condition.
Here, too, significant changes to this time could indicate a
number of problems:
(1) Lack of repair parts.
(2) Lack of trained personnel to repair the equipment.
(3) A problem that requires engineering analysis.
In summary, the advantages of using supply system data
are
:
1. The data is timely and readily available.
2. The supply system routinely collects information about
depot level repair. (The 3M system does not.)
3. Reports can be obtained which consolidate the data to
facilitate management analysis.
The disadvantages are:
1. Supply data cannot provide maintenance data needed
for engineering analysis of component failures.
2. The data only provides an indication of a possible
problem. A problem may not even exist.
3. Additional data gathering would be necessary before




This thesis has presented a number of alternatives for
gathering maintenance information. All of the alternatives
will require additional funds to finance the analysis of the
collected data, but the extent of such costs is not known at
this time. The following discussion will therefore concen-
trate on comparing the advantages and disadvantages of the
data collection capabilities of these alternatives.
For instance, designing a specialized reporting system
guarantees that, if executed properly, PME-107 will receive
the information it requires in timely fashion. To achieve
this, however, a great deal of its own resources in men,
money, and time must be expended. Having a special reporting
system for each equipment or even one for all would probably
be financially prohibitive.
On the other hand, if the 5M system was timely and
accurate, it would be ideal for the job. Unfortunately, as
shown, it is neither timely nor accurate. The 5M system is
under intensive study and improvements are coming. Until then,
an interim procedure is appropriate.
The DART program ,as discussed ,does not provide a solu-
tion to PME-107 problem. In fact, in terms of timeliness and
early detection of developing problems, it is inappropriate
to the basic task at hand.
The CASREPT system, however, can be useful. It is the
quickest source of information about potential problems. The
system is in being and operating which minimizes financial
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investment in the administrative development of a system. Al-
though the system does not provide the possibility of analy-
sis of the trend of maintenance data, it does highlight equip-
ment which are, in fact, having problems. Once identified,
further data collection and/or analysis is necessary.
The use of supply demand data has one significant advan-
tage and one significant disadvantage. Its advantage is
that it is readily and rapidly obtainable, requiring minimal
financial investment. The data is very timely due to the fact
that the system is very mechanized and accurate, including its
comm.unicat ion channels. Its disadvantage is that, like CAS-
REPTs, it cannot be used exclusively. It only provides an in-
dication that there might be a problem, because of some sig-
nificant changes in the supply data.
Project Intercept was designed to provide the exception
reporting that would be invaluable to PME-107. It was also
designed to utilize 3M data as its source of information.
That is not to say that it should, therefore, be ignored. Al-
though 3M is incomplete, there is still valuable data avail-
able and it should be used to the greatest extent possible.
The system is set up and operating and, therefore, requires
minimum expenditure of funds.
Finally, consider the Fleet Reliability Assessment Pro-
gram (FRAP). Basically, FRAP is between a specialized report-
ing system and the 5M system. It utilizes standard forms
which are augmented with desired data, minimizing learning
curve effects. It presents a "face to the fleet" and is
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recognition that action is, in fact, on going concerning some
equipment. It does not attempt to gather all data but uses
sampling techniques, thus, reducing time and money. It is a
time limited study, which also expedites the analysis and
facilitates an early resolution of the problem. It was ori-
ginally designed as a special program examining new equipment
being introduced into the fleet. However, it is being looked
at for using its techniques on older equipment. (5) Although
it uses the existing 3M system, it does require some finan-
cial investment by PME-107 for the establishment of the re-
porting network. Funds are needed to finance the visits to
the fleet units and to fund the data collecting activity.
In spite of the funding requirement, FRAP techniques seem to
provide the best alternative to meet PME-107's objective.
The use of FRAP techniques still does not provide the
actual identification of those equipment to be studied. In
this respect none of the individual alternatives provides the
answer. Therefore, the recommendations presented in the next
section consolidate the best parts of several alternatives




The recommendations below are divided into short term and
long term; the short term covering up to 10 years into the
future and the long term going on beyond this 10 years.
A. Short Term Recommendations
1. If possible, ensure all existing and future equipment
are included on the Selected Equipment List of the 3M
system,
2. Establish Project Intercept parameters for all exist-
ing and future equipment as soon as possible. This
will at least ensure that the thresholds of interest
are established and recognized by all concerned.
3. Closely monitor CASREPTs to provide possible candidates
for follow-on analysis. Cross check CASREPT demand
data with supply system data for correlation.
4. Establish liaison with the Naval Supply Systems Com-
mand, the Navy Fleet Material Support Office, and the
Ships Parts Control- Center to determine the procedures
for obtaining reports of supply demand data and data
on carcass return rates, repair survival rates, and
repair turnaround time.
5. Establish a schedule of 3M review for PME-107 equip-
ment. Do not expect 3M to be 100°6 accurate. If an
unfavorable trend is observed, use FRAP techniques
to investigate. Provide feedback periodically to
the fleet, including individual ships. Do not wait
until the investigation is complete. Publish the
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schedule of the 3M reviews to the fleet commands, es-
pecially to those commands with the appropriate equip-
ment installed.
6. For existing systems, utilize FRAP statistical sampl-
ing techniques when analyzing equipment trends. This
prevents excessive workloads and time required to ob-
fain data while providing minimum chance of error.
7. For future systems, request that they be included in
the Fleet Reliability Assessment Program (FRAP). Bud-
geting for FRAP within the procurement budget will
add more emphasis and priority to FR.-VP than if it has
to stand alone.
8. Establish specialized reporting systems only for
those equipment that continue to be a problem after
exhausting the above efforts. Such reporting systems
should be short term to avoid conflicts with the im-
plementation of 3M system improvements,
9. Like FRAP, close liaison with the fleet is essential.
For those studies undertaken, PME-107 personnel visit
the ships and provide feedback even if it is negative.
It is further recommended that PME-107 address a
letter to all ships which have PME-107 equipment in-
stalled. This letter should emphasize PME-107's
concern with the quality and timeliness of 3M report-
ing and request support of fleet personnel in proper-
ly preparing and submitting maintenance reports.
Emphasize PME-107's sincere intention to be responsive
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to fleet problems. This will provide incentive to
personnel that their efforts are not being ignored.
B . Long Term Recommendations
Within 5 to 10 years, the introduction of microprocessors
should facilitate the collection and dissemination of main-
tenance data, minimizing or perhaps eliminating PME-107's
current problem.
Microprocessors are now being developed for fleet use,
PME-107 is, in fact, introducing microprocessors in their new
equipment as built-in maintenance modules (i.e., test and
fault isolation equipment) . The Naval Sea Systems Command
(NAVSEA) is also developing a shipboard non-tactical manage-
ment information system (MIS), which contains a microproces-
sor. Therefore, it is logical that the maintenance modules
and the ship MIS be integrated.
The integration of these equipment could decrease the
present error rate evidenced in the 3M system. The PME-107
built-in test equipment could be programmed to prepare the
basic maintenance reports. The report could then be trans-
mitted to the ship's MIS computer for consolidation with
other ship's maintenance data. The data could then be trans-
mitted by radio or by tape to MSOD directly.
PME-107 and NAVSEA should work together to get the main-
tenance data relayed through the MIS to the 3M system or to
PME-107 automatically as outlined. Therefore, PME-107 should
establish a liaison with NAVSEA to determine the impact of
the development the new non-tactical micro-computer systems,
4 2

including SNAP II, on the timeliness, accuracy, and complete-
ness of the maintenance information needed by PME-107, Topics
to be explored include:
a. Development of a single compatible software language
or a language translator computer.
b. Development of a hardware interface between built-in
test equipment and non-tactical computer systems.
c. Development of software programs that will properly
interface the diverse systems.
Although these topics may go far beyond PME-107's parochial
interests, it should be involved to an extent sufficient to
protect those interests.
C. Final Note
Further study needs to be done in the area of maintenance
reporting systems, because maintenance reporting systems im-
pact several other systems and personnel considerations.
Changes to the 5M system affect these systems and should be
explored
.
a. The Naval Supply System
Presently the supply system makes very little use
of maintenance data because of its inaccuracies. How-
ever, with improvements underway, maintenance data could
be influencial in determining stock levels, buy quanti-
ties, and allowance quantities. Therefore, a study to
determine the impact of 5M improvements in these areas





More and more equipment is being added to ships
because of the continuing reduction of the size and
weight of equipment due to micro -miniaturization. With
this reduction in size has come a reduction in price and
an increased difficulty of repair. The result is that
more and more circuit boards have become throwaway parts
with no repair attempted.
It has been suggested that repair is possible
through miniature electronic repair. (1) At sea ivithout
benefit of higher level repair or possibly a spare cir-
cuit board, an equipment vital to the ship may be inoper
able. Presently the ship has no capability to repair
these boards
.
Two areas of study suggest themselves:
a. Should the throwaway/ turn- in policy of printed
circuit boards be based on availability of re-
pair rather than cost of repair?
b. Should the Navy expand organizational level re-
pair on board ships to include micro-circuitry
to provide the ship the alternative of repairing
these boards?
c. Personnel policies
It has been highly publicized that today's high
school graduate's reading ability is declining. At the
same the sophistication of the Navy's equipment is in-
creasing. Now with the addition of microprocessors,
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that sophistication will penetrate many phases of Navy
life.
1. How smart must the new sailor be to cope with
the proliferation of microprocessors?
2. How will the proliferation of microprocessors
affect training requirements and techniques?
d, PME-107
The final recommendation for study is a follow-on
to this thesis, which includes a cost analysis of the
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